Arguments agaisnt Materialism
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21-02-2017, 10:19 AM
Arguments agaisnt Materialism
I'll post more on this thread later, but here is Kripke's first argument against materialism. This can be categorized as an argument from modality and identity.

Kripke vs Materialism

"A purely logical argument was advanced by Saul Kripke against any version of the identity theory. Kripke's argument appeals to the concept of a "rigid designator." A rigid designator is defined as an expression that always refers to the same object in any possible state of affairs. Thus, the expression, "Benjamin Franklin," is a rigid designator because in the usage that I am now invoking, it always refers to the same man. This is not to say, of course, that I cannot name my dog "Benjamin Franklin," but, then, that is a different usage, a different meaning of the expression. On the standard meaning, "Benjamin Franklin" is a rigid designator. But the expression, "The inventor of daylight saving time," though it also refers to Benjamin Franklin, is not a rigid designator because it is easy to imagine a world in which Benjamin Franklin was not the inventor of daylight saving time. It makes sense to say that someone else, other than the actual inventor, might have been the inventor of daylight saving time, but it makes no sense to say that someone else, other than Benjamin Franklin, might have been Benjamin Franklin. For these reasons, "Benjamin Franklin" is a rigid designator, but “the inventor of daylight saving time" is nonrigid. With the notion of rigid designators in hand, Kripke then proceeds to examine identity statements. His claim is that identity statements, where one term is rigid and the other not rigid, are in general not necessarily true; they might turn out to be false. Thus, the sentence, "Benjamin Franklin is identical with the inventor of daylight saving time," is true, but only contingently true. We can imagine a world in which it is false. But, says Kripke, where both sides of the identity statement are rigid, the statement, if true, must be necessarily true. Thus, the statement, "Samuel Clemens is identical with Mark Twain," is necessarily true because there cannot be a world in which Samuel Clemens exists, and Mark Twain exists, but they are two different people. Similarly with words naming kinds of things. Water is identical with H20, and because both expressions are rigid, the identity must be necessary. And here is the relevance to the mind-body problem: if we have on the left hand side of our identity statement an expression referring to a type of mental state rigidly, and on the right hand side, an expression referring to a type of brain state rigidly, then the statement, if true, would have to be necessarily true. Thus, if pains really were identical with C-fiber stimulations, then the statement, "Pain = C-fiber stimulation," would have to be necessarily true, if it were to be true at all. But, it is clearly not necessarily true. For even if there is a strict correlation between pains and C-fiber stimulations, all the same, it is easy to imagine that a pain might exist without a C-fiber stimulation existing, and a C-fiber stimulation might exist without a corresponding pain. But, if that is so, then the identity statement is not necessarily true, and if it is not necessarily true, it cannot be true at all. Therefore, it is false. And what goes for the identification of pains with neurobiological events goes for any identification of conscious mental states with physical events."
Source: http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/facult...il1doc.pdf

"I think part of the appeal of mathematical logic is that the formulas look mysterious - you write backward Es!" - Hilary Putnam
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21-02-2017, 10:22 AM
RE: Arguments agaisnt Materialism
At work.

Hello Naielis! Thumbsup

Just a suggestion?

Perhaps go back to your post and edit in paragraphs, spaces, lines etc.

Will make reading/understanding what is otherwise a massive wall of text a whole lot easier.

Perhaps also a 'Point' summary for those of us with little time? Thumbsup
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21-02-2017, 10:51 AM
RE: Arguments agaisnt Materialism
(21-02-2017 10:19 AM)Naielis Wrote:  ... if it is not necessarily true, it cannot be true at all ...

This is non-sensical, if I understand it correctly, claiming that if a particular concept has a possibility of being false then it IS false. That's as idiotic as claiming that if a particular concept has a possibility being true then it IS true. What am I missing here?
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21-02-2017, 11:13 AM
RE: Arguments agaisnt Materialism
(21-02-2017 10:51 AM)Airportkid Wrote:  
(21-02-2017 10:19 AM)Naielis Wrote:  ... if it is not necessarily true, it cannot be true at all ...

This is non-sensical, if I understand it correctly, claiming that if a particular concept has a possibility of being false then it IS false. That's as idiotic as claiming that if a particular concept has a possibility being true then it IS true. What am I missing here?

Yes when I read that I knew it would be a point of contention. I think they misrepresented Kripke there. The idea is that if it isn't necessarily true, then identity theory fails. Here's another explanation.

"Kripke thinks that, if a particular brain state is identical to a particular mental state, then the identity has to be necessary. Functionalism makes such identities contingent, so if Kripke is right, then functionalism sinks right off the bat.

His argument is basically a modal plausibility argument. Consider a pain you have just now had; call it P. Consider a brain state corresponding to that pain; call it B. Now, the functionalist will argue that the brain state is identical to the pain, but that this is contingent because that very brain state could have failed to have that functional role and thus, could have failed to be that pain. Thus, P is identical to B, but B could have existed with a different functional role, so that idea is contingent.

Now, here’s the meat of the argument: on functionalism, B could exist without P. And this does seem plausible; that brain state could exist without being that pain. The thing is, do you also find it plausible that you could have had that pain, without having that very pain? Because if not, then that pain has to be necessarily identical to that brain state, because if the pain is intrinsically that brain state, and the pain is intrinsically a pain, then the brain state is intrinsically a pain, so the functionalist’s appeal to contingent identity breaks.

Not agreeing or disagreeing with Kripke here - this is just the best summary I can give of his argument. It’s given in Lecture III of Naming and Necessity, if you want to see for yourself what he said."

Source: https://www.quora.com/What-is-Saul-Kripk...aterialism

"I think part of the appeal of mathematical logic is that the formulas look mysterious - you write backward Es!" - Hilary Putnam
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21-02-2017, 11:26 AM
RE: Arguments agaisnt Materialism
So many non-sequiturs.
It is "easy to imagine" all kinds of bullshit that does not obtain in reality.
So far it's an argument against nothing.

Insufferable know-it-all.Einstein God has a plan for us. Please stop screwing it up with your prayers.
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21-02-2017, 11:30 AM
RE: Arguments agaisnt Materialism
Kripke's stuff is all a load of bullshit anyway...

"Kripke's main propositions in 'Naming and Necessity' concerning proper names are that the meaning of a name simply is the object it refers to and that a name's referent is determined by a causal link between some sort of "baptism" and the utterance of the name.

Nevertheless, he acknowledges the possibility that propositions containing names may have some additional semantic properties, properties that could explain why two names referring to the same person may give different truth values in propositions about beliefs. For example, Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly, although she does not believe that Clark Kent can fly. This can be accounted for if the names Superman and Clark Kent, though referring to the same person, have distinct semantic properties."

—Seriously? And this guy's supposedly a world-renowned philosopher and logician?

I'm a creationist... I believe that man created God.
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21-02-2017, 11:34 AM
RE: Arguments agaisnt Materialism
Here is my argument against the existence of the (dwarf) planet Pluto:

ARGUMENT

Ergo: Pluto doesnt exist. Cool









Probe? Flyby? Ill leave that to those stupid, overpaid and overestimated science niggas.

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21-02-2017, 11:36 AM
RE: Arguments agaisnt Materialism
(21-02-2017 11:26 AM)Bucky Ball Wrote:  So many non-sequiturs.
It is "easy to imagine" all kinds of bullshit that does not obtain in reality.
So far it's an argument against nothing.

I don't think you understand what's being said. It isn't necessary that a certain brain state causes a certain emotion.

"I think part of the appeal of mathematical logic is that the formulas look mysterious - you write backward Es!" - Hilary Putnam
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21-02-2017, 11:37 AM
RE: Arguments agaisnt Materialism
It appears that we have "reality", we have rules that govern how reality works, and we have things that exist within that reality. Those things that exist we call material.

What exactly is the objection? Is this all some sort of dualism, trying to make out that qualities of existent things "exist" as well? Maybe they do, maybe they don't. What does it matter? They don't appear to do anything if they do.

What does it even mean to say that something "exists"? I think it's impossible to define in a non-circular way. So I just use it in relative terms. Abstract ideas exist as much as other abstract ideas, in whatever way that is. Materials exist as much as other materials, in whatever way that is. Rules of reality exist as much as other rules. And so on. Something inside my dream exists as much as something else inside my dream.

Maybe they all ultimately exist in the same way. Maybe none of them exist at all.

Applying logic to reality, and making logical statements about reality, is already a model. I think that's an important point to realize.

I have a website here which discusses the issues and terminology surrounding religion and atheism. It's hopefully user friendly to all.
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21-02-2017, 11:38 AM
RE: Arguments agaisnt Materialism
(21-02-2017 11:34 AM)Deesse23 Wrote:  Here is my argument against the existence of the (dwarf) planet Pluto:

ARGUMENT

Ergo: Pluto doesnt exist. Cool









Probe? Flyby? Ill leave that to those stupid, overpaid and overestimated science niggas.

Your argument could contain a posteriori evidence. But it doesn't need to. You know can know that 1+1=2 without grabbing two things to demonstrate it.

"I think part of the appeal of mathematical logic is that the formulas look mysterious - you write backward Es!" - Hilary Putnam
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