Heywood and epronovost on the Problem of evil
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28-09-2015, 01:31 PM (This post was last modified: 29-09-2015 08:41 AM by epronovost.)
RE: Heywood and epronovost on the Problem of evil
(28-09-2015 12:56 PM)Heywood Jahblome Wrote:  
(27-09-2015 01:09 PM)epronovost Wrote:  In none of those cases was Gaius atrocious pain a necessity. In both cases, it was a horrible avoidable experience so, are the circumstances surrounding that event like I mentioned in post 11. Justification for atrocious pain do not make it good or even neutral neither do you think so has you have demonstrated it in post 10. I already explained why your justification of atrocious pain, anguish, terror, hopelessness and despair doesn't help in any way to extricate an anthropomorphic, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being that cares about humanity from the Problem of evil. You post is nothing more than a repeat of your post 8. This makes your final question fundamentally pointless for there is no «good circumstances» for an anthropomorphic, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being that cares about humanity to commit an evil action or let one happen for reasons I have exposed in my very first post.

The point i am trying to make is that existence of pain isn't a defining feature of good or evil. Pain is a useful but unpleasant sensation. Just because an agent takes takes advantage of that sensation as a means to accomplish a particular end doesn't make the sensation itself evil. Just because pain and suffering exist in this world doesn't not mean a good O3 God cannot exist. It simply does not follow.

If I understand your position correctly, you seem to be claiming that pain can sometimes be good and sometimes be evil depneding on the circumstance. To me that is like saying water can be good when you drink it and satisfy your thirst but evil when you drown in it. Water is water. To say pain is evil is to give it a quality it is incapable of having.

Actually, no you don't seem understand my position at all. I think you will need to read my first post and post 11 again and then ask me more precise and pertinent questions to better understand it. I will repeat it again, There is no «good» circumstances for an anthropomorphic, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being that cares about humanity to allow or generate extreme pain, hopelessness, despair, terror, oppression, etc. thus, its existence is impossible in our reality where there is extreme pain, hopelessness, despair, terror, oppression, etc.

You also staunchly misrepresent the definition of evil I have presented to discuss the Problem of evil, which is the one we use both in our justice system and everyday life to judge the morality/legality/legitimacy of our actions. It indeed talk about pain, but only very specific forms of it. Pain serves has a barometer for good and evil. To make a bad analogy myself (IT'S BAD DON'T USE IT OUTSIDE OF THIS EXEMPLE), you are arguing that celcius degree can't be uses to determine when the temperature is dangerously hot or cold because when its 25 you are comfortable and when it gets to hot or cold you can always go inside while I am saying 70 degree Celsius is dangerous so is -50 even with excellent clothing (a known and recognised fact worldwide with tons of data demonstrating why). Celsius degree were develop exclusively to help us assess the temperature and our comfort zone. The degrees of pain are used to determine the morality of our actions/events. Extreme degrees of pain like extreme pain, terror, hopelessness, despair, oppression, etc. are qualified has evil while lower ones aren't. Extreme degrees of pain are also completely useless to the well-being of individuals and societies and the only advantages they can brough is to shock people into action to avoid those things happenning again. Of course, it's also possible and even easier and more efficient to shock people into action to avoid/prevent extreme level of pain with education. In the context of our debate, the existance of extreme pain turn an anthropomorphic, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being that cares about human into an arsonist and firefighter. Such a being is systematically struck by a Nirvana fallacy in which if he doesn't provide a perfect solution, he is wrong. In that case, the Nirvana argument is no longer fallacious for the being described is for all intent and purpose perfect by human standards and must behave and think accordingly. That is the essence of the problem of responsibility inherent to the Problem of evil.

I did implied that there is a «problem of annoyance» that challenges the existence of an anthropomorphic, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being that cares about humanity just like the Problem of evil. The «problem of annoyance», or the «problem of wrong» if you prefer, is more suited to a more academic/humoristic debates than the more common Problem of evil it also undermine the concept of an anthropomorphic, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being that cares about humanity in a more subtle, but just has important way. I am starting to think that your opposition to the Problem of evil has an argument against the existence of an anthropomorphic, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being that cares about humanity find its root in you misunderstanding its core precept or you actualy want to debate something else entirely like what is my position on the issue of morality.
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06-10-2015, 01:40 AM (This post was last modified: 06-10-2015 01:43 AM by Heywood Jahblome.)
RE: Heywood and epronovost on the Problem of evil
(28-09-2015 01:31 PM)epronovost Wrote:  ....There is no «good» circumstances for an anthropomorphic, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being that cares about humanity to allow or generate extreme pain, hopelessness, despair, terror, oppression, etc. thus, its existence is impossible in our reality where there is extreme pain, hopelessness, despair, terror, oppression, etc. ....

How do you define omnipotent and omniscient? When I think of an omnipotent/omniscient God I think of one that can do all that is logically possible and know all that is knowable. Somethings, even for God are unknowable or not doable. God cannot create a being with free will and the capacity to do evil and know that being will not do evil until that being is created and allowed to act. It is really a halting problem which has been proved to be unsolvable by Alan Turing. If you are unfamiliar with halting problems watch this 8 minute video. It basically shows that the existence of a computer which can solve halting problem cannot exist. Watch it and instead of computer replace it with a god and is shows that even God cannot solve halting problems.





Basically, this world was created with beings that have free will and have the capacity to do evil. God could not know if the beings would do evil until those being were created and allowed to act. The existence of such a priori knowledge is logically impossible. If that a priori knowledge is logically impossible then God cannot be blamed for not acting upon it.
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06-10-2015, 07:00 AM
RE: Heywood and epronovost on the Problem of evil
The argument of human free will, which is rather limited, doesn't exonerate an anthropomorphic, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being that cares about humanity from the problem of responsibility inherent to the problem of evil. Furthermore, knowing that a being capable of human free will and with other human characteristics will certainly do evil if only because of Murphy’s Law. Thus it's predictable by human standard of knowledge let alone an anthropomorphic, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being that cares about humanity.

I would say that your definition of omnipotent and omniscient, while consistent, doesn't represent those characteristics correctly. The characteristics of omnipotent and omniscient mentioned in the Problem of evil refer to a being capable of doing everything and knowing everything or at least, like in the epicurean formulation, omnipotent and omniscient enough to know about all evil and capable of stopping it.

On a side note, an anthropomorphic, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being that cares about humanity is impossible in our reality because of the Problem of evil, but it’s far from being the only reason. This conception of God is racked with problems, inconsistencies and logical impossibility. If there is a God in our universe, he is nothing like that for he could not exist if only because of the Problem of evil.
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06-10-2015, 10:50 AM (This post was last modified: 06-10-2015 10:57 AM by Heywood Jahblome.)
RE: Heywood and epronovost on the Problem of evil
(06-10-2015 07:00 AM)epronovost Wrote:  ...Furthermore, knowing that a being capable of human free will and with other human characteristics will certainly do evil if only because of Murphy’s Law. Thus it's predictable by human standard of knowledge let alone an anthropomorphic, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being that cares about humanity....

I disagree with this. Consider these two scenarios which start with just the existence of God.

1. God creates a being, Adam, who has free will and the capacity to eat an apple.....or not eat it. God says to the being, "I am God and I know everything....I know you will eat this apple". Adam takes the apple, throws it into a fire where it is destroyed.

2. God creates a being, Adam, who has free will and the capacity to eat an apple.....or not eat it. God says to the being, "I am God and I know everything....I know you will not eat this apple". Adam takes the apple, bites into it, chews, and swallows.

In scenario 1 Adam could have eaten the apple. In scenario 2 Adam could have destroyed the apple. Lets assume that before God created Adam, He had in His mind a conception or "blue print" of Adam. What Turing shows us is that even with that blue print, there isn't a way for God to know by examining that blue print ahead of time what Adam will do. It is a classic halting problem. The only way for God to know that Adam would eat the apple is for Him to create Adam and see if he eats it.

Before Adam is created, the only information God has to go off is Himself. If God has free will and the capacity to do evil....yet has never done evil....why should He have an expectation that Adam will do evil?
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06-10-2015, 12:25 PM (This post was last modified: 06-10-2015 12:31 PM by Heywood Jahblome.)
RE: Heywood and epronovost on the Problem of evil
(06-10-2015 07:00 AM)epronovost Wrote:  I would say that your definition of omnipotent and omniscient, while consistent, doesn't represent those characteristics correctly. The characteristics of omnipotent and omniscient mentioned in the Problem of evil refer to a being capable of doing everything and knowing everything or at least, like in the epicurean formulation, omnipotent and omniscient enough to know about all evil and capable of stopping it.

I would say the epicurean formulation is nonsensical. Here is another way to show the formulation leads to logical contradictions. Lets assume for a moment there exist an Epicurean O3 God. If this God can do everything, It can create another being and trick that being into believing that it is itself god and all powerful and all knowing. It can give that being the powers, knowledge, and memories of an O3 god all while remaining completely hidden from that creation.

Now the Epicurean O3 God knows this and if it knows this then the O3 God must inevitably ask the question, "Am I the real O3 God or am I a created being tricked by my creator into believing I am an O3 God?".

God cannot know everything and do everything because one ability excludes the other.

Now you agree that the Epicurean formulation is nonsensical. But it seems that you are claiming it is nonsensical because of the problem of evil. I disagree with this conclusion. This formulation is nonsensical because it is nonsensical and not because evil exist in the world.
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06-10-2015, 04:28 PM (This post was last modified: 06-10-2015 07:24 PM by epronovost.)
RE: Heywood and epronovost on the Problem of evil
A definition is nonsensical because there is a reason to call them nonsensical. They aren't just nonsensical because of their «nonsensicalness». It must at some point contradict itself. The Problem of evil exist only to show a logical contradiction. You can't be an anthropomorphic, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being that cares about humanity and allow evil to plague humanity. That would necessarily make you lose one of your core characteristic. The epicurean formulation of the Problem of evil is designed to show a contradiction in a popular definition of a God which is an anthropomorphic, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being that cares about humanity. Does this definition makes sense? Of course not! That's what Epicurus was trying to demonstrate in the first place with a moral argument. Is it the only reason it doesn't make sense? Of course not! There is dozens of arguments against that type of God that attack other aspects. You have just presented another one. In no way does it affect the Problem of evil for both state the exact same thing in two different fashion.

Your examples of the two previous posts are all flawed for they present a God that isn’t an anthropomorphic, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being that cares about humanity. I can see weaknesses or character flaws in all those example from you God character while I should not if it was truly the description of an anthropomorphic, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being that cares about humanity. I would also like to point out to you that the Abrahamic God isn't of that type. He clearly isn't omnibenevolent from his own admission and one can doubt his omnipotence. Thus, the Problem of evil doesn't touch him directly per say even if the evolution of his character in our society puts him in a situation where he may be faced by the Problem of evil.

PS: We should return to the subject of the debate. This argument start to become non sequitur.
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07-10-2015, 01:04 AM
RE: Heywood and epronovost on the Problem of evil
(06-10-2015 04:28 PM)epronovost Wrote:  The epicurean formulation of the Problem of evil is designed to show a contradiction in a popular definition of a God which is an anthropomorphic, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being that cares about humanity. Does this definition makes sense? Of course not! That's what Epicurus was trying to demonstrate in the first place with a moral argument. Is it the only reason it doesn't make sense? Of course not! There is dozens of arguments against that type of God that attack other aspects. You have just presented another one. In no way does it affect the Problem of evil for both state the exact same thing in two different fashion.

Epicurus had in his argument, either stated outright or implied the following premise:

An Omnibenevolent God would want to prevent all evils.

How do you justify that premise?
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07-10-2015, 06:02 AM (This post was last modified: 07-10-2015 07:35 PM by epronovost.)
RE: Heywood and epronovost on the Problem of evil
(07-10-2015 01:04 AM)Heywood Jahblome Wrote:  Epicurus had in his argument, either stated outright or implied the following premise:

An Omnibenevolent God would want to prevent all evils.

How do you justify that premise?

Because of the problem of responsability inherant to the Problem of evil as explained in the thid paragraph of my first post and furhter detailed in the 11th, 15th and 21st posts.
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14-10-2015, 12:46 AM
RE: Heywood and epronovost on the Problem of evil
(28-09-2015 01:31 PM)epronovost Wrote:  I will repeat it again, There is no «good» circumstances for an anthropomorphic, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being that cares about humanity to allow or generate extreme pain, hopelessness, despair, terror, oppression, etc....

Is this statement an assumption in your argument or a conclusion of it?

If it is assumption, it is a subjective one. What you consider "extreme" someone else may not. If it is a conclusion, what assumptions can be made that lead to this conclusion?
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14-10-2015, 06:59 AM
RE: Heywood and epronovost on the Problem of evil
Didn't I mentioned why the Nirvana argument isn't fallacious when presented against a being that is for all intent and purpose described as perfect in post 21?

Freedom is servitude to justice and intellectual honesty.
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